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I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina ravaged the
Gulf Coast states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, forever
changing one of America's most venerable cities, New Orleans. Though
it made landfall as only a Category 3 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson
Hurricane Scale, Hurricane Katrina left over 1,300 people dead and
caused an estimated $75 billion in damage, making it the deadliest hurri-
cane in 77 years and the costliest hurricane in United States history.'
These statistics, while sobering, pale in comparison to the painful
images from New Orleans that showed families desperately searching
for lost loved ones, children helplessly waiting to be rescued from the
roofs of their homes, and corpses floating through the flooded streets.
* J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Miami School of Law. I dedicate this Note to the
memory of my father, Jeffrey Samek. He was a remarkable man and an extraordinary lawyer, and
his memory has always been a source of inspiration for me. I would also like to thank my fiancd,
Rachel Klastorin, my parents, Fern and Ron Rosen, and my sister, Allison Samek, for their
unconditional love and support. Additionally, I am grateful to Professor Stephen Vladeck for his
insight and assistance in the preparation of this Note.
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These painful images of a natural disaster were compounded by
painful images of a manmade disaster: the failed response of the local,
state, and federal governments. The images of this manmade disaster
depicted elderly citizens slowly dying while waiting for transportation
from area hospitals, people living for days on an interstate highway
while waiting to be evacuated, and thousands of others desperate for
food and water in a convention center with no semblance of authority.
Beyond its physical damage, Hurricane Katrina destroyed the
notion that, four years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the United States was prepared to respond to a major disaster within its
borders.2 Images of the tragic aftermath of Hurricane Katrina left many
Americans wondering how such a failed government response could
happen in the United States, who was responsible, and how such a fail-
ure could be prevented in the future. By most accounts, local, state, and
civilian federal officials were overwhelmed in their efforts to respond to
Hurricane Katrina and were unable to maintain order, prevent looting, or
effectively evacuate residents. 3 For example, numerous members of the
New Orleans Police Department deserted their posts after the storm, and
others reportedly engaged in the looting that they were supposed to pre-
vent.4 The failed government response is well represented by former
Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") Director Michael
Brown, who admitted that the government did "not know that thousands
of survivors without food or water had taken shelter at the [New Orle-
ans] convention center, despite a day of news reports" that identified the
dire conditions.5 Order in the Gulf Coast region did not begin to return
until a week after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, following the arrival
of a military force that would grow to include over 70,000 troops, 400
aircraft, and 20 ships.6
The botched response to Hurricane Katrina threatens to forever
change one of America's most venerable doctrines: that without express
2. See, e.g., Editorial, Unprepared, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2005, at A30 ("[C]oming four
years and tens of billions of dollars in preparedness spending after the Sept. 11 attacks, it suggests
that the country's readiness to cope with a major disaster remains woefully lacking.").
3. See, e.g., Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, § 1, at I ("[FEMA] officials expected the state and city to direct their own
efforts .... Leaders in Louisiana and New Orleans, though, were so overwhelmed ... that they
were ... unable to manage the crisis .... While local officials assumed that Washington would
provide rapid and considerable aid, federal officials . . . proceeded at a deliberate pace.").
4. Ann M. Simmons, 51 Police Fired in New Orleans, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at AS.
5. Spencer S. Hsu & Susan B. Glasser, FEMA Director Singled Out by Response Critics,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at Al.
6. See 151 CONG. REC. S9945 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2005) (statement of Sen. Warner); Press
Release, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Northern Command Support to Hurricane Katrina
Disaster Relief (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.northcom.mil/newsroom/news-release/
2005/091205.htm.
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authorization by Congress, the United States military may not directly
participate in domestic law enforcement activities. This doctrine is com-
monly linked to, and was codified by, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.'
In the weeks immediately following Hurricane Katrina, many politicians
called for reform or repeal of the Posse Comitatus Act, arguing that it
prevented the military from rapidly deploying forces into New Orleans
to restore order and conduct humanitarian missions' This proposition
received its most vocal support from President George W. Bush who, in
a national address from New Orleans just three weeks after the destruc-
tion, stated that "[iut is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires
greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces - the
institution of our government most capable of massive logistical opera-
tions on a moment's notice."9 Senator John Warner, chairman of the
United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, endorsed the Presi-
dent's position when he recommended to Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld that the Defense Department "conduct a thorough review of
the entire legal framework governing a President's power to use the reg-
ular armed forces to restore public order in those limited situations
involving a large-scale, protracted emergency like the present one [Hur-
ricane Katrina]. This review should include the Posse Comitatus Act
itself." "
The appeals of President Bush and others to reform the laws gov-
erning the domestic use of the armed forces, including the Posse Comi-
tatus Act, seem based on an understanding that Hurricane Katrina
exposed statutory problems with the federal government's ability to use
the military to respond to domestic natural disasters. The legal authority
of the President, as commander in chief of the armed forces, to use the
military to respond to, and provide relief from, domestic natural disas-
ters is rooted in two areas of law. The first is the constitutional, statu-
tory, and regulatory law that governs domestic military use. This area
includes the Posse Comitatus Act, its statutory exceptions, and extensive
7. Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
8. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Bush Wants to Consider Broadening of Military's Powers
During Natural Disasters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at A 18 ("President Bush said ... Congress
should immediately begin discussing whether to amend federal law so the military could take
responsibility right away in natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina ... apparently referring to the
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878."); Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Military May Propose an Active-
Duty Force for Relief Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at A15 ("Pentagon and military officials
say that federal troops could not have been sent into the chaos of New Orleans without breaking
the Posse Comitatus law.").
9. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Hurricane Relief from Jackson
Square, New Orleans, La. (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/09/20050915-8.html.
10. Letter from Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), Chairman, U. S. Senate Comm. on Armed Servs.,
to Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def. (Sept. 14, 2005) (on file with author).
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Department of Defense ("DoD") regulations. The second area is the law
governing the federal government's response to domestic natural disas-
ters, primarily the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act." l
This Note will examine the validity of these concerns. Did Hurri-
cane Katrina's aftermath expose statutory problems with the federal
government's ability to use the military for domestic natural disaster
relief? Or did it, instead, expose a failure to properly deploy the military
under existing disaster relief statutes? Part I of this Note will analyze
the statutes and regulations that govern the domestic use of the military
and the military's role in disaster response, including the Posse Comita-
tus Act. Part II will examine the statutes and regulations, primarily the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, that
govern the federal government's response to domestic natural disasters.
Part III will examine the federal government's use of the military in its
response to Hurricane Katrina, including the particular statutes invoked
by civilian authorities.
Part III concludes that Hurricane Katrina did not reveal either a
need to broaden the federal government's ability to use the military for
domestic natural disaster relief or a need to reform or repeal the Posse
Comitatus Act. Instead, existing laws, if properly executed, would have
provided adequate authority for the military to respond to, and provide
relief from, Hurricane Katrina and other domestic natural disasters.
Although this Note focuses on the use of the military in response to
domestic natural disasters, as opposed to manmade disasters such as acts
of terrorism, many of the statutes addressed do not distinguish between
these different types of disasters and, thus, would apply to both.
II. THE LAWS GOVERNING DOMESTIC USE OF THE UNITED STATES
MILITARY AND THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN DOMESTIC
DISASTER RESPONSE
A complex framework of statutes and regulations governs the
domestic use of the military. This framework is comprised of constitu-
tional provisions, federal statutes, and detailed directives and regulations
promulgated by the DoD to implement and abide by such provisions and
statutes. The President's general authority to use the military is rooted
in his constitutional position as "commander in chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when
called into the actual service of the United States."'" The Constitution,
11. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-
5204 (2000).
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
[Vol. 61:441
2007] HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT 445
in its very next section, also requires that the President "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed."' 3 While a literal reading of these two
sections together could lead to the conclusion that the President, as com-
mander in chief, could use the Army and Navy to execute laws, such a
reading would threaten two important American principles: the "tradi-
tional and strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into
civilian affairs" 14 and Congress's power "[t]o make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces [and] [t]o provide for
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insur-
rections and repel invasions."' 5 These two principles were solidified in
1878 when, following the use of federal troops to execute the law in
states that had been part of the Confederacy during the Civil War, Con-
gress passed and the President signed the Posse Comitatus Act.
16
A. The Posse Comitatus Act
The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits United States military
personnel from direct participation in civilian law enforcement activi-
ties.' 7 The Act has its roots in the Anglo-American tradition of military
subordination to civilian authority.' 8 In Latin, the term "posse comita-
tus" literally means "power of the county." In modern terms, however,
it is more aptly described as "[a] group of citizens who are called
together to help the sheriff keep the peace or conduct rescue opera-
tions.' 9 Today, the Posse Comitatus Act is a criminal statute that
states:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly author-
ized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of
the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute
the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
14. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
16. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE POSSE CoMrrATUS ACT & RELATED
MATTERS: THE USE OF THE MILITARY TO EXECUTE CIVILIAN LAW 9-10 (2000) (CRS Report 95-
964 S).
17. U.S. Northern Command, The Posse Comitatus Act, http://www.northcom.mil/aboutus/
possecomitatus.htm ("Some of those law enforcement activities would include interdicting
vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit and seizures; or making
arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities. Prohibiting direct military involvement
in law enforcement is in keeping with long-standing U.S. law and policy limiting the military's
role in domestic affairs.").
18. Id. For a brief history of the Posse Comitatus Act, see Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the
Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 383,
389-405 (2003).
19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (8th ed. 2004).
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two years, or both.20
Although the Posse Comitatus Act itself applies only to the Army and
Air Force, its substantive prohibitions have been extended to both the
Navy and the Marines by statute and DoD regulation.2' The United
States Coast Guard is exempt from the restrictions of the Posse Comita-
tus Act because the Coast Guard is statutorily authorized to perform law
enforcement functions.22 While the Act does not specifically address
whether its restrictions apply to the National Guard, "[t]here seems
every reason to consider the National Guard part of the Army or Air
Force, for purposes of the ...Act, when in federal service."23 The
Posse Comitatus Act, however, does not apply to members of the
National Guard when they are in state service, leaving them free to con-
duct law enforcement activities.2 4
The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply when the Constitution or
Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military to execute the
law,25 and Congress has done so on numerous occasions.26 For instance,
under the Insurrection Act, Congress has authorized the President to use
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000). See also, DOYLE, supra note 16, at 48 ("The Posse Comitatus
Act is a criminal statute under which there has apparently never been a prosecution.").
21. See 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2000) (directing the Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations to
ensure that military support for civilian law enforcement agencies does not "include or permit
direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search,
seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is
otherwise authorized by law"); DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5525.5, DoD COOPERATION
WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFciALs art. E2.1.8 (Dec. 20, 1989) [hereinafter DoD
DIRECTIVE 5525.5] (precluding members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps from
direct participation in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such
activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law).
22. 14 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) ("The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all
applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States.").
23. DOYLE, supra note 16, at 41.
24. See Gilbert v. United States, 165 F.3d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1999) ("The [Posse Comitatus]
Act does not apply to members of the National Guard unless they have been called into 'federal
service.'").
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
26. For a listing of many of the lesser known statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus, see
DOYLE, supra note 16, at 21-22 n.48. Among the exceptions cited by Doyle are:
16 U.S.C. § 23 (Secretary of the Army may detail troops to protect Yellowstone
National Park upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior);
16 U.S.C. § 78 (Secretary of the Army may detail troops to protect Sequoia and
Yosemite National Parks upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior);
16 U.S.C. § 593 (President may use the land and naval forces of the United States to
prevent destruction of federal timber in Florida);
18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 1116 (Attorney General may request the assistance of federal or
state agencies - including the Army, Navy and Air Force - to protect foreign
dignitaries from assault, manslaughter and murder);
18 U.S.C. § 351 (FBI may request the assistance of any federal or state agency -
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the armed forces to suppress an insurrection "in any State against its
government. '2 7 The Act also authorizes the President to use the armed
forces to suppress a rebellion in a state when such a rebellion "make[s] it
impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States. 2 8 Under the
guise of "Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies,"
Congress has expressly authorized the armed forces to share information
and equipment with civilian law enforcement agencies (primarily for the
purpose of counter-drug assistance) and to assist in "emergency situa-
tion[s] involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction."2 9
Even while providing the above assistance, however, military personnel
are not permitted to participate "in a search, seizure, arrest, or other sim-
ilar activity."3
B. Department of Defense Directive 3025.1
The DoD divides its civil support roles into three categories: "Mili-
tary Support to Civil Authorities," "Military Assistance for Civil Distur-
bances," and "Department of Defense Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Officials." These three categories are collectively referred
to as "Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities."3 Each category is
the subject of a detailed DoD directive that delineates the Department's
policy with respect to that category of assistance. The primary concern
including the Army, Navy and Air Force - in its investigations of the assassination,
kidnapping or assault of a Member of Congress);
18 U.S.C. § 3056 (Director of the Secret Service may request assistance from the
Department of Defense and other federal agencies to protect the President);
25 U.S.C. § 180 (Presideat may use military force to remove trespassers from
Indian treaty lands); 42 U.S.C. § 98 (Secretary of the Navy at the request of the
Public Health Service may make vessels or hulks available to quarantine authority at
various U.S. ports);
42 U.S.C. § 1989 (magistrates issuing arrest warrants for civil rights violations may
authorize those serving the warrants to call for assistance from bystanders, the posse
comitatus, or the land or naval forces or militia of the United States).
Id.
27. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2000). See also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TiE USE
OF FEDERAL TROOPS FOR DISASTER ASSISTANCE: LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2006) (CRS Report RS22266).
("The Insurrection Act has been used to send the armed forces to quell civil disturbances a number
of times during U.S. history, most recently during the 1992 Los Angeles riots and during
Hurricane Hugo in 1989, during which wide-spread looting was reported in St. Croix, Virgin
Islands."); Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149,
164-65 (2004) (tracing the origins of the Insurrection Act).
28. 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2000).
29. 10 U.S.C. §§ 371, 382 (2000).
30. 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2000).
31. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 3025.15, MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL
AUTHORITIES art. E2.1.8 (Feb. 18, 1997).
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of this Note, the DoD's response to domestic, disaster-related civil emer-
gencies such as hurricanes, is categorized as Military Support to Civil
Authorities and is governed by DoD Directive 3025.1.3
12
DoD Directive 3025.1 provides for a single, centralized system by
which the different DoD components can plan for, and respond to,
requests for Military Support to Civilian Authorities that arise from the
actual or anticipated consequences of civil emergencies. 33 The Directive
defines Military Support to Civil Authorities as "[t]hose activities and
measures taken by the DoD Components to foster mutual assistance and
support between the [DoD] and any civil government agency in planning
or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to,
the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks. 34 Civil emergencies
are further defined as "[a]ny natural or manmade disaster or emergency
that causes or could cause substantial harm to the population or infra-
structure," including "a 'major disaster' or 'emergency,' as those terms
are defined in the Stafford Act."
35
In order to successfully undertake the missions and tasks that may
be assigned to the DoD following a presidential declaration of either a
major disaster or emergency under the Stafford Act, DoD Directive
3025.1 details the specific powers and responsibilities that have been
delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the various combatant com-
manders and service secretaries. 36 Among those delegations is the des-
ignation of the Secretary of the Army as the DoD Executive Agent, with
the corresponding authority to act for the Secretary of Defense. 37  The
32. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 3025.1, MILITARY SUPPORT FOR CIVIL
AUTHORITIES (Jan. 15, 1993) [hereinafter DoD DIRECTIVE 3025.1]. Military Assistance for Civil
Disturbances, defined as "[giroup acts of violence and disorders prejudicial to public law and
order in the 50 States," including terrorism, is beyond the scope of this Note. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 3025.12, MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES arts. E2.1.4,
E2.1.12 (Feb. 4, 1994). Although this Note does not focus on military cooperation with civilian
law enforcement officials, as those activities are not primarily concerned with disaster relief, the
DoD Directive concerning military cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials is
important with respect to disaster relief because it provides a detailed review of permissible and
non-permissible actions under the Posse Comitatus Act. See DoD DIRECTIVE 5525.5, supra note
21, art. E4 ("Restrictions on Participation of DoD Personnel in Civilian Law Enforcement
Activities").
33. DoD DIRECTIVE 3025.1, supra note 32, art. 1.3.
34. Id. art. E2.1.21. See also id. art. 4.4.1 (specifically excluding military assistance for civil
law enforcement operations from the definition of Military Support for Civilian Authorities).
35. Id. art. E2.1.4 ("Under [the Stafford Act], the terms 'major disaster' and 'emergency' are
defined substantially by action of the President in declaring that extant circumstances and risks
justify his implementation of the legal powers provided by those statutes.").
36. Id. arts. 4.3, 5.
37. Id. art. 4.3.1. See also id. art. E2.1.11 (defining DoD Executive Agent as "[t]he individual
designated by position to have and to exercise the assigned responsibility and delegated authority
of the Secretary of Defense").
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DoD Executive Agent may further designate, or delegate the responsibil-
ity for designating, a Defense Coordinating Officer ("DCO") who "is the
DoD interface with FEMA, other Federal providers, and the State Coor-
dinating Officer."38 The DCO is also "responsible for validating and
coordinating mission assignments from the [Federal Coordinating
Officer]" appointed by the FEMA Director after a Stafford Act declara-
tion.3 9 These delegations provide a clear delineation of which DoD per-
sonnel are responsible for and can authorize specific DoD actions in
response to presidential declarations under the Stafford Act. The Direc-
tive also acknowledges that "all DoD resources are potentially available
for [Military Support to Civilian Authorities]."4 Lastly, the Directive
authorizes the publication of the DoD Manual for Civil Emergencies to
provide "guidance for the preparation, coordination and execution of
military support to civil authorities during civil emergencies within the
United States" and to "serve[ ] as a reference for other Federal, State,
and local agencies on how the Department of Defense supports civil
authorities . . . in returning their communities to a state of
'normalcy.'" 41
C. Immediate Response Authority
The DoD's Immediate Response Authority, contained in DoD
Directive 3025.1, authorizes "immediate action by military commanders
...to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property
damage" following a civil emergency or attack.42 Such assistance by
military commanders may be provided only in response to requests by
civil authorities and only "where there has not been any declaration of
major disaster or emergency by the President [under the Stafford Act] or
[an] attack."43 Once there has been a declaration under the Stafford Act,
Military Support to Civilian Authorities should be coordinated with the
Federal and Defense Coordinating Officers, as directed by DoD Direc-
tive 3025.1 and the DoD Manual for Civil Emergencies. 4 The assis-
38. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DoD 3025.1-M, MANUAL FOR CIVIL EMERGENCIES 1 (1994)
[hereinafter DoD MANUAL FOR CIVIL EMERGENCIES].
39. Id. See also infra Part III.A: Major Disaster Declarations (discussing the Federal
Coordinating Officer).
40. DoD DIRCTIVE 3025.1, supra note 32, art. 4.4.4 (emphasis supplied).
41. DoD MANUAL FOR CIVIL EMERGENCIES, supra note 38, at 2.
42. DoD DIRECTIVE 3025.1, supra note 32, art. 4.5.1. For a more detailed review of
Immediate Response Authority, see Jim Winthrop, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Immediate
Response Authority and Other Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA), 1997 ARMY LAW. 3
(1997).
43. DoD DIRECTIVE 3025.1, supra note 32, arts. 4.5.1, E2.1.18.
44. See DoD DIRECTIVE 3025.1, supra note 32; DoD MANUAL FOR CIVIL EMERGENCIES,
supra note 38.
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tance that military commanders are authorized to provide under the
Immediate Response Authority is similar to that authorized under the
Stafford Act and includes: rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical
treatment of casualties; safeguarding the public health; emergency resto-
ration of essential public services; emergency clearance of debris; road-
way movement control and planning; safeguarding, collecting, and
distributing food, essential supplies, and materiel; damage assessment;
interim emergency communications; and facilitating the reestablishment
of civil government functions.4 5 Unlike military assistance provided
under the Stafford Act, assistance provided by military commanders
under the Immediate Response Authority "may also include law
enforcement activities that would ordinarily be prohibited by the Posse
Comitatus Act."'4 6 However, military commanders "shall not perform
any function of civil government unless absolutely necessary on a tem-
porary basis" and "shall facilitate the reestablishment of civil responsi-
bility at the earliest time possible."47
III. THE STAFFORD ACT: THE LAW GOVERNING THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC
NATURAL DISASTERS
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act ("Stafford Act") is the principle statute that governs the federal gov-
ernment's response to domestic disasters. The Stafford Act is intended
"to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal
Government to State and local governments in carrying out their respon-
sibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from such
disasters."48 To accomplish this, section 401 of the Stafford Act autho-
rizes the President to declare major disasters, and section 501 of the Act
authorizes the President to declare emergencies. 49 These respective sec-
tions of the Act also provide a framework that governs the procedures
for obtaining such declarations, as well as which federal resources may
be utilized pursuant to each type of presidential declaration. Addition-
ally, the Stafford Act provides for the utilization of DoD resources, in
certain circumstances, absent either a major disaster or emergency
declaration.
45. See DoD DIRECTWE 3025.1, supra note 32, art. 4.5.4.
46. See ELSEA, supra note 27, at 6.
47. DoD DIRECnVE 3025.1, supra note 32, art. 4.4.10.
48. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974 § 101, 42
U.S.C. § 5121 (2000).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5191 (2000).
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A. Major Disaster Declarations
Section 102 of the Stafford Act defines a major disaster as:
[Any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm,
high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, vol-
canic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or,
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the
United States, which in the determination of the President causes
damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disas-
ter assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available
resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organiza-
tions in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused
thereby.5°
The governor of the affected state must begin the process for obtaining a
major disaster declaration. Under section 401 of the Stafford Act, "[a]ll
requests for a declaration by the President that a major disaster exists
shall be made by the Governor of the affected State" through the appro-
priate FEMA Regional Director.5" The governor must base a major dis-
aster declaration request "on a finding that the disaster is of such
severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities
of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal assis-
tance is necessary."52 According to the Bush Administration, the princi-
ple that response efforts should first utilize state and local resources
reflects the layered approach of the American system of federalism.53
As a prerequisite to major disaster assistance under the Stafford Act, the
governor of a state must also "take appropriate response action under
State law and direct execution of the State's emergency plan" and "fur-
nish information on the nature and amount of State and local resources
which have been or will be committed to alleviating the results of the
disaster."54 However, the governor of an affected state "need not spec-
ify which forms of [Stafford Act major disaster] assistance are
50. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2000). In 2005, President Bush issued forty-eight major disaster
declarations under the Stafford Act, including four for Hurricane Katrina (one each for Florida,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana). See Federal Emergency Management Agency, Annual
Major Disaster Declarations Totals, http://www.fema.gov/news/disastertotals_annual.fema (last
visited Mar. 15, 2006).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 5170. See also 44 C.F.R. § 206.36(a) (2006) ("The Governor should submit
the request to the President through the appropriate [FEMA] Regional Director to ensure prompt
acknowledgment and processing.").
52. 42 U.S.C. § 5170. See also 44 C.F.R. § 206.36(b).
53. FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, THE WHITE HouSE, Tim FEDERAL RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 12, 17 (2006).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (a governor must also "certify that, for the current disaster, State and
local government obligations and expenditures (of which State commitments must be a significant
proportion) will comply with all applicable cost-sharing requirements of this Act"). See also 44
C.F.R. § 206.36(c).
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needed."55
The process described above for obtaining a major disaster declara-
tion may be relaxed "[flor those catastrophes of unusual severity and
magnitude when field damage assessments are not necessary to deter-
mine the requirement for supplemental Federal assistance."56 In such a
situation, the governor of the affected state "may send an abbreviated
written request through the [FEMA] Regional Director for a declaration
of a major disaster."57 An abbreviated request for a major disaster dec-
laration "may be transmitted in the most expeditious manner available"
and may be addressed to the Director of FEMA if "the FEMA Regional
Office is severely impacted by the catastrophe."58 The governor's major
disaster declaration request must still be based on a finding that "[t]he
situation is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is
beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments" and
that "Federal assistance under the [Stafford] Act is necessary to supple-
ment the efforts and available resources of the State."59 At a minimum,
an abbreviated request for a major disaster declaration must contain: (1)
confirmation that the governor has taken appropriate action under state
law and directed the execution of the state emergency plan; (2) informa-
tion describing the nature and amount of state and local resources which
have been or will be committed to alleviate the results of the disaster;
and (3) certification by the governor that state and local government
obligations and expenditures for the current disaster will comply with all
applicable cost sharing requirements of the Stafford Act.6"
After a request for a major disaster declaration is made by the gov-
ernor of an affected state, the request is evaluated by the FEMA
Regional Director for that state, who must submit a recommendation to
the FEMA Director on whether to grant the declaration.61' The Regional
Director's recommendation must be "[b]ased on information obtained by
FEMA/State preliminary damage assessments of the affected area(s) and
consultations with appropriate State and Federal officials" and "include
a discussion of State and local resources and capabilities, and other
assistance available to meet the major disaster or emergency-related
needs."62 Once the FEMA Regional Director's recommendation on the
major disaster declaration request is received by the FEMA Director, the
55. ELSEA, supra note 27, at 5.




60. Id. See also 44 C.F.R. § 206.36(c).
61. 44 C.F.R. § 206.37(b) (2006).
62. Id.
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Director must formulate a recommendation on the request.63 The FEMA
Director's recommendation on the major disaster declaration request
must "be based on a finding that the situation is or is not of such severity
and magnitude as to be beyond the capabilities of the State and its local
governments" and must "contain a determination of whether or not sup-
plemental Federal assistance under the Stafford Act is necessary and
appropriate. 64 In developing this recommendation, the FEMA Director
must consider such factors as:
[T]he amount and type of damages; the impact of damages on
affected individuals, the State, and local governments; the available
resources of the State and local governments, and other disaster relief
organizations; the extent and type of insurance in effect to cover
losses; assistance available from other Federal programs and other
sources; imminent threats to public health and safety; recent disaster
history in the State; hazard mitigation measures taken by the State or
local governments, especially implementation of measures required
as a result of previous major disaster declarations; and other factors
pertinent to a given incident.65
The FEMA Director's recommendation is forwarded to the President
with the affected state's governor's request for a major disaster declara-
tion.6 6 It is then within the President's discretion to grant the governor's
request and declare that a major disaster exists under the Stafford Act.6 7
"Immediately upon" the declaration of either a major disaster or an
emergency, the President must appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer
("FCO") for the affected area.68 The President has delegated the respon-
sibility for the appointment of an FCO to the FEMA Director, who in
turn may delegate the responsibility to either the FEMA Deputy Director
or the FEMA Associate Director.69 The FCO must immediately initiate
action to assure that federal assistance is provided in accordance with
the major disaster declaration or the emergency declaration.70 As part of
that responsibility, the FCO must: "(1) make an initial appraisal of the
types of relief most urgently needed; (2) establish such field offices as
he deems necessary and as are authorized by the President; (3) coordi-
nate the administration of relief, including activities of the State and
local governments [and other relief or disaster assistance organiza-
63. 44 C.F.R. § 206.37(c).
64. 44 C.F.R. § 206.37(c)(1).
65. Id. See also 44 C.F.R. § 206.48 (2006) (listing the factors considered by FEMA when
evaluating a governor's request for a major disaster declaration).
66. 44 C.F.R. § 206.37(c).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2000).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 5143 (2000).
69. 44 C.F.R. § 206.41(a) (2006).
70. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tions]."' The FCO generally undertakes these responsibilities in con-
junction with the State Coordinating Officer ("SCO"), who is appointed
by the affected state's governor "for the purpose of coordinating State
and local disaster assistance efforts with those of the Federal Govern-
ment," and the DCO.72 The FCO also receives all requests for federal
assistance under the Stafford Act and tasks the requests to the appropri-
ate federal agency for support.73 In the case of requests for military
assistance, the request is tasked to the DoD via the DCO.7 4
A presidential declaration of a major disaster under the Stafford Act
authorizes two primary types of federal assistance to the affected state or
states: general federal assistance and essential federal assistance. Gen-
eral federal assistance allows the President, or his designee, to:
(1) direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to
utilize its authorities and the resources granted to it under Federal law
(including personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial,
technical, and advisory services) in support of State and local assis-
tance efforts;
(2) coordinate all disaster relief assistance (including voluntary assis-
tance) provided by Federal agencies, private organizations, and State
and local governments;
(3) provide technical and advisory assistance to affected State and
local governments for-
(A) the performance of essential community services;
(B) issuance of warnings of risks and hazards;
(C) public health and safety information, including dissemina-
tion of such information;
(D) provision of health and safety measures; and
(E) management, control, and reduction of immediate threats to
public health and safety; and
(4) assist State and local governments in the distribution of medicine,
food, and other consumable supplies, and emergency assistance.75
The President, or his or her designee, has the extremely broad power "to
direct any Federal agency to utilize ... personnel, equipment, supplies,
[and] facilities ...in support of State and local assistance efforts."7 6
Virtually the only restrictions on this broad power are that the federal
agencies must only utilize authorities and resources that are granted to
them under federal law and must only utilize them in support of state
71. 42 U.S.C. § 5143(b) (2000). See also 44 C.F.R. § 206.42 (2006).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 5143(c). See also 44 C.F.R. § 206.41(c); supra Part II.B: Department of
Defense Directive 3025.1 (discussing the Defense Coordinating Officer).
73. DoD MANUAL. FOR Civn EmERGENCIES, supra note 38, art. C3.2.1.3.
74. Id.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 5170a (2000) (emphasis supplied).
76. Id.
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and local assistance efforts.77 Thus, under the guise of general federal
assistance, the President, or his or her designee, has the entire resources
of the federal government, including the military, with which to support
state and local assistance efforts.78
The doctrine of essential federal assistance provides additional fed-
eral support to affected states beyond the assistance provided by the fed-
eral government under the doctrine of general federal assistance. Under
essential federal assistance, the President, or his or her designee, may
direct federal agencies to "provide assistance essential to meeting imme-
diate threats to life and property resulting from a major disaster."79
Essential federal assistance is divided into four categories: (1) federal
resources; (2) medicine, food, and other consumables; (3) work and ser-
vices to save lives and protect property; and (4) contributions. 80 Essen-
tial federal assistance with regards to federal resources entails
"[u]tilizing, lending, or donating to State and local governments Federal
equipment, supplies, facilities, personnel, and other resources.., for use
or distribution ... in accordance with the purposes of [the Stafford]
Act."'" The President, or his or her designee, may provide essential fed-
eral assistance in the form of medicine, food, and other consumables by
"[d]istributing or rendering through State and local governments... and
other relief and disaster assistance organizations medicine, food, and
other consumable supplies, and other services and assistance to disaster
victims. '8 2 The President, or his or her designee, may direct federal
agencies to perform a variety of essential work and services on public or
private lands or waters in order to save lives and protect and preserve
property or public health and safety.8 3 These services include:
(A) debris removal;
(B) search and rescue, emergency medical care, emergency mass
care, emergency shelter, and provision of food, water, medicine, and
other essential needs, including movement of supplies or persons;
(C) clearance of roads and construction of temporary bridges neces-
sary to the performance of emergency tasks and essential community
services;
77. Id.
78. See DoD DIRECTIVE 3025.1, supra note 32, art. 4.1.2 (acknowledging that, "[u]pon
declaring a major disaster or emergency under [the Stafford Act], the President may direct any
Agency of the Federal Government to undertake missions and tasks . to provide assistance to
State and local agencies").
79. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b (2002).
80. Id.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(a)(I).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(a)(2).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(a)(3).
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(D) provision of temporary facilities for schools and other essential
community services;
(E) demolition of unsafe structures which endanger the public;
(F) warning of further risks and hazards;
(G) dissemination of public information and assistance regarding
health and safety measures;
(H) provision of technical advice to State and local governments on
disaster management and control; and
(I) reduction of immediate threats to life, property, and public health
and safety.84
Lastly, following a major disaster declaration the President, or his or her
designee, may direct federal agencies to make "contributions to State or
local governments or owners or operators of private nonprofit facilities
for the purpose of carrying out the" above essential federal assistance.85
In addition to the abovementioned general and essential federal
assistance, the Stafford Act authorizes a variety of other forms of federal
assistance that do not concern the United States Armed Forces. Section
404 of the Act provides for hazard mitigation grants to "reduce the risk
of future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering in any area affected by a
major disaster," and sections 405 and 406 authorize funding for the
repair, restoration, and reconstruction of federal, state, and local govern-
ment facilities.86 Section 406 also authorizes funding for the repair, res-
toration, and reconstruction of private nonprofit facilities that "provide[]
critical services . . . in the event of a major disaster."87 The Act also
provides for extensive assistance to individuals and households.88
B. Emergency Declarations
Section 102 of the Stafford Act defines an emergency as:
[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the
President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local
efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and pub-
lic health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe
in any part of the United States.8 9
The Stafford Act provides the President with two procedures by which
to declare an emergency. The first of those procedures requires the gov-
84. Id.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(a)(4).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170c, 5171, 5172 (2000).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 5172(a)(3)(A)(i).
88. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 5174, 5177, 5179-83 (2000).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (2000). In 2005, President Bush issued sixty-eight emergency
declarations under the Stafford Act, including forty-eight related to Hurricane Katrina. See
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005 Federal Disaster Declarations, http://
www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema?year=2005#em (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
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ernor of the affected state to make a request for an emergency declara-
tion.9" The requirements and processes for the President to grant an
emergency declaration at the request of the governor of the affected state
are very similar to those described above for a major disaster declara-
tion.9' However, in addition to the requirements for a major disaster
declaration request, the governor's request for an emergency declaration
must also be based on a finding that the situation "[r]equires supplemen-
tary Federal emergency assistance to save lives and to protect property,
public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster."92
The second procedure by which the President may declare an emer-
gency under the Stafford Act allows the President to do so without the
request of the governor of the affected state. Section 501(b) of the Staf-
ford Act authorizes the President to provide federal emergency assis-
tance without a gubernatorial request "when he determines that an
emergency exists for which the primary responsibility for response rests
with the United States because the emergency involves a subject area for
which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United
States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority."93
Section 501(b) also authorizes the FEMA Regional Director, or another
federal agency through the FEMA Regional Director, to recommend "a
Presidential declaration of emergency in the absence of a Governor's
request." 94
A presidential declaration of an emergency under the Stafford Act
authorizes the President to provide both specified and general federal
emergency assistance. The specified assistance which the President, or
his or her designees in the FEMA, may provide following an emergency
declaration are similar to, yet narrower in scope than, the assistance
which may be provided following a major disaster declaration. For
instance, in the case of an emergency declaration, the President may still
"direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to utilize its
authorities and the resources granted to it under Federal law (including
personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and
advisory services) in support of State and local assistance efforts," but
only when those State and local assistance efforts are "to save lives,
protect property and public health and safety, and lessen or avert the
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 5191 (2000); 44 C.F.R. § 206.35 (2006).
91. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 5191, and 44 C.F.R. § 206.35, with 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2000), and
44 C.F.R. § 206.36 (2006).
92. 44 C.F.R. § 206.35(b)(2).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b).
94. 44 C.F.R. § 206.35(d).
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threat of a catastrophe."9 Following an emergency declaration, the
President may also: coordinate all disaster relief assistance, 96 provide
technical and advisory assistance to affected State and local govern-
ments, 97 remove debris,98 and assist State and local governments in the
distribution of medicine, food, and other consumable supplies.99 Addi-
tionally, whenever the above-specified methods of federal emergency
assistance are inadequate, the President may provide general assistance
"with respect to efforts to save lives, protect property and public health
and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe."' 10
C. Utilization of Department of Defense Resources Under the
Stafford Act
In addition to authorizing the President to utilize federal resources
upon the declaration of a major disaster or an emergency, the Stafford
Act specifically authorizes the President to utilize DoD resources to per-
form emergency work in "the immediate aftermath of an incident which
may ultimately qualify" as an emergency or a major disaster under the
Stafford Act.' In the aftermath of such an event, the governor of the
affected state may request that the President "direct the Secretary of
Defense to utilize the resources of the Department of Defense for the
purpose of performing on public and private lands any emergency work
which is made necessary by such incident[,] which is essential for the
preservation of life and property" and which cannot be effectively dealt
with by state and local governments.1
0 2
The governor's request must be submitted through the FEMA
Regional Director in the same manner as requests for major disaster and
emergency declarations and must include "[i]nformation describing the
types and amount of DoD emergency assistance being requested."10 3
This request must be submitted within forty-eight hours of the occur-
rence of the incident."° The President shall grant a governor's request
and authorize the emergency utilization of DoD resources, to the extent
practicable, if the President determines that such work is essential for the
95. 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a) (2000). See also 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a)(1) (general federal assistance
following a major disaster declaration).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(2).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(3).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(5).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(7).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 5192(b).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c)(1) (2000).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c)(1) (emphasis supplied); 44 C.F.R. § 206.34(a) (2006).
103. 44 C.F.R. § 206.34(b).
104. Id.
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preservation of life and property. 05 DoD emergency assistance that is
authorized in this manner "may only be carried out for a period not to
exceed [ten] days."'0 6 Thus, the Stafford Act provides the President
with the flexibility to respond to an incident by authorizing the use of
DoD resources to save lives and property even before formal emergency
or major disaster declarations are issued under the Act.
D. The Stafford Act and the Posse Comitatus Act
Although the Stafford Act authorizes the use of the military to
respond to both major disasters and emergencies even before they may
be declared, the Stafford Act does not constitute an exception to the
Posse Comitatus Act. 10 7 Consequently, federal troops that are deployed
pursuant to the Stafford Act may not engage in civilian law enforcement
activities, such as preventing looting and conducting traffic control.'0 8
However, federal troops deployed under the Stafford Act would be per-
mitted to engage in activities that serve a valid military purpose, yet
have the incidental benefit of enforcing civilian law. 0 9 Such activities
might include humanitarian and search-and-rescue patrols that have the
incidental benefit of deterring looting or providing traffic control on mil-
itary supply routes." 0
IV. THE USE OF THE MILITARY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S
DISASTER RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA
Given a basic understanding of the laws that govern the role for,
and dictate the use of, the United States military in the federal govern-
ment's domestic disaster response, this section addresses the actual use
of the military in the federal government's response to Hurricane
Katrina. Does the federal government's response to Hurricane Katrina
illustrate a case for the repeal of the Posse Comitatus Act, as some have
argued, or does it indicate a failure to properly utilize authority already
granted under existing law? An analysis of the existing disaster relief
statutes invoked in preparation for, and in response to, Hurricane Katrina
105. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c)(1).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c)(1); 44 C.F.R. § 206.34(d).
107. Winthrop, supra note 42, at 13 ("Noticeably absent as an exception to the Posse
Comitatus Act is the Stafford Act; thus, [Military Support to Civilian Authorities] operations do
not permit DoD units to perform any law enforcement functions in support of civilian law
enforcement authorities under the authority of the Stafford Act."); ELSEA, supra note 27, at 4
("The authority [to employ the U.S. armed forces for domestic disaster relief] does not constitute
an exception to the [Posse Comitatus Act] .... The Stafford Act does not authorize the use of
federal military forces to maintain law and order.").
108. See Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
109. ELSEA, supra note 27, at 4.
110. Id. at 4.
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indicates that civilian authorities possessed the broad ability to ask any
federal agency, including the DoD, to assist in disaster relief. As such,
Hurricane Katrina revealed neither a need to broaden the federal govern-
ment's ability to use the military for domestic natural disaster relief, nor
a need to reform or repeal the Posse Comitatus Act, because existing
laws, if properly executed, provide adequate authority for the military to
respond to domestic natural disasters.
A. Pre-Katrina Stafford Act Declarations
In the days leading up to Hurricane Katrina's Gulf Coast landfall,
state and federal leaders followed the proper Stafford Act protocols to
obtain emergency and major disaster declarations from President Bush.
On August 27, 2005, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
submitted a request to President Bush for a presidential declaration of
emergency under the Stafford Act, as well as for $9 million in assistance
for emergency protective measures.1 1 Governor Blanco's letter con-
tained the necessary determinations for an emergency declaration,
including her determination "that this incident is of such severity and
magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State
and affected local governments, and that supplementary Federal assis-
tance is necessary to save lives, protect property, public health, and
safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster."'1 12 On the same day,
President Bush granted Governor Blanco's request and issued an emer-
gency declaration under the Stafford Act." 3 In addition to granting
Governor Blanco's request for "debris removal and emergency protec-
tive measures," President Bush authorized the Director of FEMA "to
provide such other forms of assistance under [the Emergency Assistance
provisions] of the Stafford Act" as deemed appropriate." 4 Following
Stafford Act procedures, the Director of FEMA appointed an FCO for
the State of Louisiana in his publication of the President's Emergency
Declaration."' Similar presidential declarations of emergency were
issued the following day for Mississippi and Alabama.1" 6
The day after a Stafford Act emergency was requested and declared
111. See Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor, State of Louisiana, to George W.
Bush, President of the United States (Aug. 27, 2005), available at http://www.gov.state.a.us
(search "Governor Blanco's letter to President Bush, August 27, 2005"). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 5191 (2000) (Stafford Act procedure for emergency declaration).
112. Blanco, supra note 111.
113. Notice of Presidential Declaration of Emergency for the State of Louisiana, 70 Fed. Reg.
53,238 (Sept. 7, 2005) (effective Aug. 27, 2005, but retroactive to Aug. 26, 2005).
114. Id.
115. Id. (appointing William Lokey of FEMA as the FCO for the declared emergency).
116. See Notice of Presidential Declaration of Emergency for the State of Mississippi, 70 Fed.
Reg. 53,239 (Sept. 7, 2005) (effective Aug. 28, 2005); Notice of Presidential Declaration of
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for the State of Louisiana, Hurricane Katrina rapidly expanded, attained
its peak intensity, and became a Category 5 storm on the Saffir-Simpson
Hurricane Scale." 7 As the danger to the Gulf Coast increased, Gover-
nor Blanco requested that the President "declare an expedited major dis-
aster for the State of Louisiana" and estimated that the state would
require $130 million in Stafford Act assistance." 8 Governor Blanco's
letter complied with the Stafford Act's requirements for a major disaster
declaration request, as the Governor determined that Hurricane Katrina
would "be of such severity and magnitude that effective response will be
beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments and
that supplementary Federal assistance will be necessary." Furthermore,
Governor Blanco certified that Louisiana had implemented its State
Evacuation and Sheltering Plan and "furnished [information] on the
nature and amount of State and local resources that have been or will be
used to alleviate the conditions of this disaster."' 19
President Bush granted Governor Blanco's request the next day,
August 29, 2005, after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, and issued a
major disaster declaration under the Stafford Act for the State of Louisi-
ana.' 20 The President's major disaster declaration for Louisiana author-
ized the FEMA Director to provide "debris removal and emergency
protective measures ... Hazard Mitigation . . . and any other forms of
assistance under the Stafford Act" that he deemed appropriate.' 2' Fol-
lowing Stafford Act procedures, the Director of FEMA appointed an
FCO for the State of Louisiana in his publication of the President's
Major Disaster Declaration. 22 Major disaster declarations were also
issued after Katrina's landfall on August 29, 2005, for the States of Mis-
sissippi and Alabama.1
3
Emergency for the State of Alabama, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,061 (Sept. 13, 2005) (effective Aug. 28,
2005).
117. See KNABB, supra note 1, at 3.
118. Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor, State of Louisiana, to George W.
Bush, President of the United States (Aug. 28, 2005) (on file with the Univeristy of Miami Law
Review).
119. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2000) (Stafford Act procedure for a major disaster
declaration).
120. Notice of Presidential Declaration of a Major Disaster for the State of Louisiana, 70 Fed.
Reg. 53,803 (Sept. 12, 2005) (effective Aug. 29, 2005).
121. Id.
122. Id. (appointing William Lokey of FEMA as the Federal Coordinating Officer for the
declared major disaster).
123. See Notice of Presidential Declaration of a Major Disaster for the State of Alabama, 70
Fed. Reg. 53,801 (Sept. 12, 2005) (effective Aug. 29, 2005); Notice of Presidential Declaration of
a Major Disaster for the State of Mississippi, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,804 (Sept. 12, 2005) (effective Aug.
29, 2005).
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B. Authorized Versus Actual Responses
The formal federal response to Hurricane Katrina's Gulf Coast
landfall began on August 27, 2005, when President Bush granted Gover-
nor Blanco's request that an emergency be declared under the Stafford
Act for the State of Louisiana.1"4 The President's emergency declara-
tion authorized the federal government to provide the State of Louisiana
with specific types of emergency assistance, as governed by the Stafford
Act. t25 As part of the emergency assistance that is authorized by an
emergency declaration, the President may "[d]irect any Federal agency
... to utilize.., personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and manage-
rial, technical and advisory services[ ] in support of State and local
emergency assistance efforts to save lives, protect property and public
health and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe."'
126
Among the federal agencies that the President was authorized to direct
to support emergency assistance efforts was the DoD. 127 Thus, prior to
Hurricane Katrina's landfall on the Gulf Coast, the President had the
statutory authority to direct "all DoD resources" to support emergency
assistance efforts in Louisiana "to save lives, protect property and public
health and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe."'' 28
The methods that the President could have instructed the military to
use in supporting these efforts to save lives and property were virtually
limitless. While any active duty military personnel performing emer-
gency assistance under the Stafford Act would have been subject to the
restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act, and thus unable to perform
civilian law enforcement duties, they would have been permitted to
engage in activities that served a valid military purpose, yet had the inci-
dental benefit of enforcing civilian law.1 29 Although President Bush had
the statutory authority under the Stafford Act to deploy active duty fed-
eral military personnel to Louisiana on August 27, 2005, and although
the military began to plan for such a supporting role in hurricane relief
as early as August 24, 2005,130 no active duty federal military personnel
were deployed to the Gulf Coast to support Hurricane Katrina relief
124. Notice of Presidential Declaration of Emergency for the State of Louisiana, supra note
120.
125. See supra pp. 27-30.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(1) (2002) (emphasis supplied).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 5122(7) (2000) (defining "federal agency" as "any department,
independent establishment, Government corporation, or other agency of the executive branch of
the Federal Government").
128. DoD DIRECnvF 3025.1, supra note 32, art. 4.4.4 (emphasis supplied) (stating that "all
DoD resources are potentially available for [Military Support to Civilian Authorities]"); 42 U.S.C.
§ 5192(a)(1).
129. See ELSEA, supra note 27, at 4.
130. See TOWNSEND, supra note 53, at 22 (On August 24, 2005, USNORTHCOM "issued a
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before the storm's landfall on August 29, 2005.1'1
The pre-landfall emergency declarations President Bush issued
under the Stafford Act for Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi were
ongoing in nature. 32 Consequently, the pre-landfall emergency assis-
tance, described above, could have continued in the form of post-landfall
emergency assistance during the storm's immediate aftermath. Never-
theless, even if President Bush had not declared emergencies under the
Stafford Act for the Gulf Coast before Hurricane Katrina's landfall, he
still possessed the statutory authority to use the military for disaster
relief during the interim period between the storm's landfall and post-
landfall declarations of either an emergency or a major disaster. Such
authority is found in section 403 of the Stafford Act, which specifically
authorizes the President to utilize DoD resources to perform emergency
work in "the immediate aftermath of an incident which may ultimately
qualify" as an emergency or a major disaster under the Act, contingent
on a request for assistance to the President from the governor of the
affected state. 133 Lastly, if President Bush had not issued a Stafford Act
declaration prior to Hurricane Katrina's landfall, and if Governor Blanco
did not request military assistance under section 403 of the Stafford Act
prior to a Stafford Act declaration, extensive military assistance could
still have been provided to the civil authorities in Louisiana and the Gulf
Coast under the guise of the Immediate Response Authority. '34 Military
assistance under the Immediate Response Authority is even broader than
that authorized by the Stafford Act, as it is not restricted by the Posse
Comitatus Act. 135 Therefore, with or without a Stafford Act declaration,
statutory authorization existed prior to Hurricane Katrina for the military
to provide emergency assistance to civilian authorities in the immediate
aftermath of the storm's landfall.
President Bush's major disaster declarations for the States of Ala-
bama, Louisiana, and Mississippi on the day of Hurricane Katrina's
landfall, at the requests of the states' respective governors, authorized
the full extent of federal disaster relief and assistance available under the
Warning Order for supporting commands to prepare for requests for Department of Defense
assets should the need arise.").
131. SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN
COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, H.R.
REP. No. 109-377, at 202 (2006) [hereinafter SELECT COMM. REP.].
132. See, e.g., Notice of Presidential Declaration of Emergency for the State of Louisiana,
supra note 120 (noting that the Stafford Act emergency for the State of Louisiana began on
August 26, 2005, and was continuing in nature).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c)(1) (2000). See also supra Part III.B.
134. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
135. See ELSEA, supra note 27, at 6.
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Stafford Act. 13 6 The Stafford Act vests the authority to direct this
response in the President.' 37 As part of the relief and assistance that was
authorized by the major disaster declarations, President Bush had the
statutory authority under the Stafford Act - on the day of Hurricane
Katrina's landfall - to "direct any Federal agency [including the DoD]
. .. to utilize its authorities and ... resources ... including personnel,
equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory
services [to] State and local assistance efforts."' 138 Additionally, Presi-
dent Bush's major disaster declarations provided him with the statutory
authority - again, on the day of Hurricane Katrina's landfall - to "coor-
dinate all disaster relief assistance (including voluntary assistance) pro-
vided by Federal agencies, private organizations, and State and local
governments."1 39 Yet, the President did not execute his role as "the
commander in chief of federal disaster response."' 4 Most of the Presi-
dent's authority and responsibility under the Stafford Act was assigned
to Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, who "executed these
responsibilities late, ineffectively, or not at all."' 4 1 In sum, the statutory
authority for substantial federal action was present from the day of the
storm forward, but concomitant federal action was conspicuously absent.
V. CONCLUSION
On August 29, 2005, the day Hurricane Katrina made landfall on
the Gulf Coast, there were no active duty federal military personnel
deployed in Alabama, Louisiana, or Mississippi to support federal relief
and recovery efforts. 4 2 By September 12, 2005 - two weeks later -
over 22,600 active duty federal military personnel were deployed in Ala-
bama, Louisiana, and Mississippi to support federal hurricane relief and
recovery efforts. 14 3 That deployment constituted "the largest military
deployment within the United States since the Civil War."'" The Presi-
136. See Notices of Presidential Declaration of Major Disasters for the States of Louisiana,
Alabama, and Mississippi, supra notes 120, 123 (authorizing the FEMA Director to provide
"debris removal and emergency protective measures ... Hazard Mitigation . . .and any other
forms of assistance under the Stafford Act you may deem appropriate") (emphasis supplied)).
137. SELECT COMM. REP., supra note 131, at 132.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(l) (2000). See also notes 75-88 and accompanying text (detailing the
relief and assistance authorized under the Stafford Act as the result of a major disaster
declaration).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(2). See also notes 75-88 and accompanying text (detailing the relief
and assistance authorized under the Stafford Act as the result of a major disaster declaration).
140. SELECT COMM. REP., supra note 131, at 132.
141. Id. at 131.
142. Id. at 202.
143. Id..
144. Id. at 201 (citing Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the
Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
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dent of the United States possessed no greater statutory authority to
deploy active duty federal troops to the Gulf Coast on September 12,
2005, when over 22,600 active duty federal troops were deployed, than
he did on August 29, 2005, when no active duty federal troops were
deployed. The President's authority for this deployment was established
by his emergency and major disaster declarations under the Stafford Act,
the first of which was issued on August 27, 2005 - three days before
any active duty federal troops were deployed to the Gulf Coast.I45 Once
deployment orders were finally issued for them, "it took just eight hours
for 3,600 troops from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., to
be on the ground in Louisiana and Mississippi with vital search-and-
rescue helicopters."'
' 46
President Bush had the statutory authority under the Stafford Act to
deploy active duty federal military personnel to the Gulf Coast for disas-
ter relief and assistance on the day that Hurricane Katrina made landfall.
This same statutory authority provided the basis for the deployment of
over 22,600 active duty federal military personnel in the weeks follow-
ing the storm. Absent the Posse Comitatus Act, President Bush could
have deployed the same number of active duty federal military personnel
to the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, as he could have under the Staf-
ford Act. Consequently, the federal government's response to Hurricane
Katrina does not establish a case for repealing the Posse Comitatus Act.
Given a proper understanding of the laws that govern the role for, and
dictate the use of, the United States military in the federal government's
domestic disaster response, Hurricane Katrina revealed neither a need to
broaden the federal government's ability to use the military for domestic
natural disaster relief nor a need to reform or repeal the Posse Comitatus
Act. To the contrary, Hurricane Katrina revealed a need for those vested
with the responsibility and authority to execute federal disaster relief
efforts to learn the relevant law.
Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Oct. 27, 2005) (written statement of Honorable Paul
McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, at 4)).
145. See Notice of Presidential Declaration of Emergency for the State of Louisiana, supra
note 120; SELECT COMM. REP., supra note 131, at 202.
146. Drew Brown, Seth Borenstein & Alison Young, Delayed Military Response Critical,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 17, 2005, at A-4.
